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SPECIAL ESSAY
COMPARATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES PROJECTS:
A FORUM, NOT A FORMULA
by John S. Applegate'
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, states and cities across the United
States have established environmental priorities projects to iden-
tify and to rank their environmental problems.2 Some of the
projects are private organizations, some are part of a state or
local environmental or public health authority, and some have
other sponsorship.3 Nearly all are financially supported by the
1. James B. Helmer, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of
Law. I wish to express my deep appreciation to Hon. Robert Black, Jerry Lawson,
and Pat Timm, my colleagues at the Hamilton County Environmental Priorities
Project, for many valuable discussions of the theory and practice of environmental
priorities projects. They did not know that I was making mental notes of our conver-
sations for future use, so they must be held blameless for this essay. Also for the
record, while I serve as vice-chair of the Project's board of directors, the views
expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the Project or any of its
participants.
2. As of October 1995, thirty-three states and tribes, and thirteen cities and
counties had begun or completed environmental priorities projects. Project News 5,
THE COMPARATIVE RISK BULLETIN (newsletter of the Northeast Center for Compara-
tive Risk, Vermont Law School) Sept./Oct. 1995 at 9-11. EPA's Office of Policy, Plan-
ning, and Evaluation reports that it has supported forty-five projects. Project Summa-
ries (last modified Mar. 7, 1997) <http://www.epa.gov/docs/futures/risk/summaries>.
3. Comprehensive overviews of state and local environmental priorities projects
can be found in Richard A. Minard, Jr., CRA and the States: History, Politics, and
Results, in COMPARING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: TOOLS FOR SETTING GOVERNMENT PRI-
ORITIES 23-61 (J. Clarence Davies ed., 1996) [hereinafter COMPARING ENVIRONMENTAL
RISKS]; RICHARD MINARD ET AL., STATE COMPARATIVE RISK PROJECTS: A FORCE FOR
CHANGE (Northeast Center for Comparative Risk, Vermont Law School) Mar. 15,
1993 [hereinafter FORCE FOR CHANGE]. See also INT'L CITY/COUNTY MANAGEMENT
ASSOCIATION, RISK ASSESSMENT: THE ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1997), at 41-55
(describing a number of local comparative priorities projects). EPA's comparative risk
website contains a wealth of information on environmental priorities projects. See
EPA, Comparative Risk-Regional and State Planning Division (last modified Mar. 7,
1997) <http://www.epa.gov/oppeinet/oppe/futures/risk/>.
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United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to repli-
cate, on a state or local scale, its own internal efforts of about a
decade ago to determine whether it was using its resources wise-
ly.4 Environmental priorities projects seek to engage government
officials, industry representatives, environmentalists, and non-
aligned citizens - environmental experts and lay persons - in
organizations that allow them to collect data about the environ-
mental threats to the health and welfare of the area under
study, to deliberate over the findings, and then to evaluate the
problems in terms of their severity. Most of the projects also con-
sider and rank actions to address the identified problems. The
analytical framework for evaluating severity is almost always a
type of comparative risk assessment. That is, the project at-
tempts to determine the "worst" of the identified problems in
terms of the risks that they pose to human health and the envi-
ronment. Within this framework, they also seek to reach consen-
sus results that are supported by citizens, industry, and govern-
ment officials. The hope is that the results will guide the allo-
cation of environmental protection resources to the most urgent
problems, where the effort will do the most good.
Environmental priorities projects have been controversial.
State and local regulators see themselves confronting a range of
problems that far exceeds their ability to handle them, so they
are inclined to welcome risk comparison projects as a way to
help make difficult resource allocation decisions. Industry often
sees itself as the victim of irrational public fear, so it is drawn to
risk comparison as a way to place industrial environmental risks
in a more favorable perspective. However, environmental advoca-
cy groups often oppose priorities projects vigorously.5 The oppo-
sition is sometimes attributed to turf battles and this is undoubt-
edly sometimes the case, but in fact the opposition is far more
substantial and more fundamental. Environmentalists challenge
the use of risk as a common metric against which direct compari-
sons among environmental threats can validly be made, and they
strongly oppose any implication that problems which do not score
high on a risk scale are unworthy of governmental attention. In
addition, they question whether environmental priorities projects
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. The environmentalist critique of comparative risk assessment is set out in
Part LB, infra.
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- or the public generally, or regulatory agencies - have enough
information about environmental threats to make credible judg-
ments about the relative seriousness of various environmental
threats.
This essay posits a role for environmental priorities projects
that responds to the need to address forthrightly the consequenc-
es of limited environmental protection resources, yet accounts for
the inadequacies of risk as the metric for allocation decisions.
The key is recognizing that the process of deciding how to ap-
proach an area's environmental problems can be separated from
the analytical tools used to make the decision. Great value can
be derived from a good decision making process, even if the spe-
cific results are quite limited.
Environmental priorities projects can be understood as the
product of two developments in environmental law and policy.
The first is the growth of comparative risk assessment as an
analytical tool. Comparison of risks is the extension of the adop-
tion of quantitative risk assessment as the justification for and
measure of environmental regulation. Consequently, comparative
risk is the logical methodology for setting priorities among envi-
ronmental problems. The second development is the renewal of
interest in developing deliberative democratic institutions. Delib-
erative democratic theory' is a reaction to the perceived poor
quality of current public debate. It asserts that public decisions
should reflect a common vision of the public good, which can best
(or only) be reached by an inclusive, consensus-based process of
thoughtful debate or deliberation. The decisionmaking processes
of environmental priorities projects tend to be structured along
these lines.
Comparative risk and deliberative democracy are not inexora-
bly paired, however. Comparative risk does not imply any partic-
ular decisionmaking process at all.7 Indeed, comparative risk is
6. This essay uses the term "deliberative democratic theory" loosely to encom-
pass communitarian, republican, and civic republican approaches to public
decisionmaking. The competing approach is interest group pluralism, or adversarial
(in the sense of competing interests, not in the narrow sense of the common law
judicial system) decisionmaking. See infra Part II.A.
7. U.S. EPA, A Guidebook to Comparing Risks and Setting Environmental Priori-
ties [hereinafter Guidebook] (last modified Mar. 7, 1997)
<http://www.epa.gov/docs/futures/risk/roadmap/rmap/chap3.txt.html> (accepting several
methods, from negotiation to formulas, for ranking).
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primarily a technocratic concept that emphasizes expert analysis
of mostly quantified data.8 Conversely, the deliberative demo-
cratic approach is a style of public decisionmaking that has no
special attachment to environmental issues, and certainly not to
risk assessment in particular. Yet it is the very disjunction of the
two components of environmental priorities projects, which Parts
I and II of this essay develop, that makes them such a useful
way of evaluating the strengths and limitations of these efforts.
It is my contention, based in part on my own experience with
such projects,9 that the limitations of the comparative risk as-
sessment formula restrict the ability of environmental priorities
projects to establish formal environmental priorities. Only mod-
est claims for their substantive work product are appropriate. As
argued in Part III, however, their real value lies in their ability
to stimulate civic involvement and to create a forum for in-
formed, deliberative public discussion of environmental issues.1°
The idea of setting priorities is not incidental to the forum-cre-
ation function. It is, in fact, key to its effectiveness in this role,
but a priorities list is not the most important outcome of envi-
ronmental priorities projects.
This essay has a second purpose, as well. It should be obvious
that issues like the implementation of deliberative democratic
theory, the relationship between democratic decisionmaking
processes and the technical nature of environmental law, and the
proper role of local institutions in environmental decisionmaking
are not confined to the single setting of environmental priorities
projects. Environmental priorities projects stand at the intersec-
tion of these questions, however, and so they provide an excel-
8. Cf. THOMAS 0. McGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULA-
TORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991) (describing the incentives for
regulatory analysis and its weaknesses). Justice Breyer's proposals for an elite corps
of civil servants exemplify the technocratic approach. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING
THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 59-68 (1993).
9. In addition to participation in the Hamilton County Environmental Priorities
Project, I chair the Fernald Citizens Advisory Board (nde Task Force), which advises
the U.S. Department of Energy on the environmental remediation of a former nuclear
weapons production facility. One of the board's charges was to recommend clean-up
priorities for the site. From these vantage points, I have had the opportunity to
observe a number of other priority-setting efforts as well.
10. See Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Cri-
tique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 633 (1992). "The better
answer to the question 'how safe is safe?' may be the improved question: 'how good
is the social dialogue on safety?"' Id.
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lent opportunity to study these fundamental issues of environ-
mental decisionmaking in a concrete setting."
II. EPA, COMPARATIVE RISK, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PRIORITIES PROJECTS
A. From Risk to Priorities
The early pollution control statutes were aimed primarily at
acute health effects that would be avoided in most people by
reducing their exposure to pollutants below a scientifically deter-
minable level. To provide a margin of safety for uncertainties,
unusually sensitive persons, or unforeseen circumstances, the
"safe" level could be further reduced by a scientifically deter-
mined numerical factor. Thus the Clean Air Act, 2 promulgated
in its modern version in 1970, required air pollution controls to
be set at the level that "is requisite to protect the public welfare
from any known or anticipated adverse effects."'3 However,
some diseases, such as cancer, do not behave like the overt
health effects of conventional air and water pollutants. Carcino-
gens have long latency periods, may have effects at extremely
low doses, and affect a relatively small number of persons cata-
strophically. 4 Nevertheless, the same "safe" or "margin of safe-
ty" approach dominated the original enactments for carcinogens.
The Clean Air Act required hazardous air pollutants (mainly
carcinogens) to be regulated to a level that "provides an ample
margin of safety to protect the public health."'"
As understanding of the mechanism of carcinogenesis in-
11. I plan to continue this exploration in a project tentatively entitled, Acting
Locally: The Deliberative Democratic Ideal and Environmental Decisionmaking.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(b)(2) (1970).
13. Id.
14. John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory
Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 261, 264-65 (1991). See
generally JOSEPH V. RODRICKS, CALCULATED RISKS: UNDERSTANDING THE TOXICITY
AND HUMAN HEALTH RISKS OF CHEMICALS IN OUR ENVIRONMENT 38-144 (1992) (de-
scribing the characteristics of fast poisons, slow poisons, and carcinogens).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1988) (amended 1990). In the Vinyl Chloride case,
the D.C. Circuit interpreted the statute to require EPA to establish an emissions
limitation that would result in an "adequate" level of safety and then, if feasible, to
reduce the emissions limitation still further to achieve an extra margin of safety. See
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1164-65 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (en banc).
19971
76 NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW
creased, however, confidence in the idea of a "safe" level of a
carcinogen eroded."6 The dominant supposition (it is not a cer-
tainty) that cancer is triggered by one chance "hit" of a molecule
of a carcinogen on one receptive target cell suggests that there is
theoretically no level of exposure above zero - no "threshold" -
below which a carcinogen has no effect. 7 Lacking the ability to
identify a safe/unsafe cut-off for regulation, regulators began to
speak in terms of "unreasonable risk" to describe a greater-than-
zero level of risk that would be permitted by regulation. In other
words, EPA would not try to eliminate all risk from exposure to
a chemical, because that would require eliminating all exposure
to the chemical, which would usually require discontinuing its
use. Elimination is possible (often desirable), but more expensive
than EPA or Congress was willing to impose. Further, in the
case of chemicals already in the environment, such as hazardous
wastes, elimination of exposure is simply impossible to achieve.
Thus, the later environmental statutes that focus primarily on
toxic substances use various formulations to impose a greater-
than-zero, "unreasonable" risk standard.
The problem with the unreasonable risk standard is that it
defies precise ex ante definition in two respects. First, the idea of
risk means potential, not actual harm; therefore, the regulation
is based on preventing, not actual illness, but the chance of the
illness occurring. As the basis for imposing thousands or millions
of dollars of costs on the economy, this is not the firmest of
.grounds. Second, it is indefinite as to the level of risk that it
denotes. Assuming that risk is expressed as the excess lifetime
risk of death from cancer caused by the chemical,"8 the term
16. The developments traced in this and in the following paragraphs are de-
scribed in greater detail in Applegate, supra note 14, at 264-84. See Al Alm, Why We
Didn't Use "Risk" Before, 17 EPA J. 13, 13-14 (Mar.-Apr. 1991) (describing growing
importance of risk from the perspective of a former Deputy Administrator of EPA);
Paul A. Locke, The Limitations of Comparative Risk Assessment, 2(1) SHEPHARD'S EX-
PERT AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 75, 77-81 (1994).
17. See RODRICKS, supra note 14, at 145-157 (discussing theories of the mecha-
nism of carcinogenesis).
18. Each one of these qualifications is a choice: we tend to focus on fatalities
instead of all illnesses, cancer instead of non-cancer effects, individual risk instead of
expected number of deaths, etc. See generally J. Clarence Davies, Ranking Risks:
Some Key Choices, in COMPARING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS, supra note 3, at 14-21.
Finkel dismisses this kind of risk comparison as "fatality comparison." Adam M.
Finkel, Comparing Risks Thoughtfully, 7 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENVIRONMENT 325,
330 (1996); Locke, supra note 16, at 83-90.
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"unreasonable" does not tell us whether a one in ten risk is ac-
ceptably low, or whether a one in one hundred thousand is unac-
ceptably high. Nor, indeed, does it tell us how to make that judg-
ment. Generally speaking, however, "unreasonable" is taken to
mean that a number of non-health factors may be considered,
notably cost and technical feasibility in determining the risk
level.'9
Paradoxically, the indefiniteness of the unreasonable risk
formulation resulted, not in a tendency to rely on narrative or
qualitative descriptions of the hazard and the residual risk level,
but rather in a great deal of pressure to quantify the risk before
regulation and the residual risk after controls were imposed."
This was the result of several overlapping developments: a gen-
eral effort to rationalize disparate approaches to toxic substanc-
es, a demand for more rigorous justification of regulatory restric-
tions, and a repeated judicial demand for justification through
quantification."' The upshot was that courts and regulators, and
ultimately Congress, settled on a technique known as quantita-
tive risk assessment to be the primary measure of environmental
harm and of remedial efforts.22 Quantitative risk assessment
responded to the uncertainties of the unreasonable risk standard
with apparently scientific, objective, and precise numbers
reached through a well-defined and rational methodology.2"
19. Applegate, supra note 14, at 268-277.
20. The distinction between "before" and "after" risk levels is developed in John
S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, Information, and Regulatory Structure in
Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 277, 305-306 (1992). The Supreme
Court's "Benzene" decision exemplifies the difference. The Court required OSHA to
demonstrate a definite and unacceptably high level of existing risk as the prerequi-
site to taking any regulatory action. Once restrictions were justified by a finding of
the unacceptable risk, OSHA was permitted to require the lowering of the risk to the
lowest "feasible" level. See generally Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1979).
21. See Applegate, supra note 14, at 281-284 (criticizing the demand for
quantification and expressing concern about the data demands of quantitative risk
assessment); Hornstein, supra note 10, at 569-75; Wendy E. Wagner, The Science
Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1613 (1995).
22. Congress was, interestingly, the last to fall in line. Its initial foray into toxic
substances regulation, the Delaney Clause, which banned any carcinogen at any level
in food additives, required only a qualitative assessment that a substance was a
carcinogen. By 1990, however, the Clean Air Act Amendments expressly regulated air
toxics to a residual risk level of one in one million. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A) (1989).
23. The uses and methods of risk assessment were authoritatively described in
the 1983 Red Book, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
1997]
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Quantitative risk assessment also responded to a broader
interest in regulatory rationality, that is, the desire to make
regulatory actions consistent with each other and efficient in
objective, quantifiable terms. Rationality is a bulwark against
judicial challenge and also against political dissatisfaction with
the costs that regulation imposes on the constituents of elected
officials. If quantitative risk assessment held out, in Donald
Hornstein's words, the "allure of science" for courts reviewing
agency action under indefinite legal standards, it also held out
the "allure of rationality" and the "allure of synopticism" for
EPA's own policy analysis.24 Quantitative risk assessment pro-
vides one of the numerical inputs to cost-benefit analysis, some
version of which is the overarching analytical structure of regu-
latory rationality and the implicit counterweight to human
health in making the "unreasonableness" determination. Because
risk appears to be a common characteristic of many different
environmental programs in different areas, it provides a way to
make comparisons across those programs to evaluate the consis-
tency and relative cost-effectiveness of regulatory interventions.
Risk was thus attractive to regulators as a powerful tool for
internal management as well as external justification."
In roughly this way risk became established as the principal
measure of EPA's activities. At that point, risk took on a life of
its own, and it came to be perceived as the raison d'etre for the
agency. By the end of William Ruckelshaus' second stint as Ad-
ministrator of EPA, risk reduction defined EPA's mission.2" If
GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983). Subsequent NRC publications have
refined but not replaced the underlying paradigm. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT (1994); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1996) [here-
inafter UNDERSTANDING RISK].
24. Hornstein, supra note 10, at 565-584.
25. Frederick R. Anderson, CRA and Its Stakeholders: Advice to the Executive
Office, in COMPARING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS, supra note 3, at 66-68.
26. Hornstein, supra note 10, at 585-586; Gilbert S. Omenn, Making Use of Can-
cer Risk Assessment, 12:4 ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 29, 29 (Summer 1996)
("Risk is the coin of the realm in environmental, health, and safety regula-
tion .... "); F. Henry Habicht II, EPA's Vision for Setting Environmental Priorities,
in WORST THINGS FIRST, at 33-38 (Adam M. Finkel & Dominic Goldings eds., 1994);
Charles W. Kent & Frederick W. Allen, An Overview of Risk-Based Priority Setting
at EPA, in WORST THINGS FIRST, supra at 47-50.
A small but telling example of this can be found on EPA's web page. The link on
the page entitled "Risk Reduction", Browse EPA Topics (last modified Jan. 21,1998)
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risk reduction in the various media for which EPA is responsible
(air, water, solid waste, industrial chemicals, etc.) is the goal,
then the logic of making risk comparisons across EPA's programs
is well nigh irresistible. EPA wanted to know if it was applying
the same standards to air, water, and radiation, for example.
EPA also wanted to know whether it was targeting the most
serious threats and whether its efforts in various programs were
equally effective in reducing risk. Given the chronic and substan-
tial gap between EPA's actual resources and the number of envi-
ronmental threats that EPA might usefully address, these ques-
tions are not just interesting, they are essential to responsible
management. 7 The acceptance of the basic risk metric, in other
words, opened up whole new vistas of useful analysis within and
across EPA's many programmatic areas, and it was not long
before EPA vigorously pursued these possibilities."
Ruckelshaus' successor, Lee Thomas, began an aggressive
program of comparative risk assessment.' 9 The initial effort,
entitled Unfinished Business,0 gathered EPA officials from
across the agency's programs to identify and rank the environ-
mental problems that each faced, and then to make comparisons
across programs. The results were necessarily tentative (EPA
was explicit about this),' but some were striking. For example,
it appeared that EPA allocated relatively large amounts of its
resources to hazardous waste in comparison to their relatively
modest risks, and allocated little in relation to indoor air pollu-
tion, pesticides, and worker risks.32
Subsequently, three EPA regions undertook comparative anal-
<http://www.epa.gov/epahome/browse.htm>, takes the reader to Office of Policy, Plan-
ning, and Evalutaion (last modified Sept. 16, 1997) <http://www.epa.gov/oppe>. In
other words, risk reduction is what EPA's strategic planners think they are doing.
27. The case for paying close attention to allocating scarce regulatory resources is
made in Applegate, supra note 20, at 282-289.
28. Minard, supra note 3, at 27-33. More generally, the history and problems of
comparative risk assessment are considered in two excellent collections of essays
published by Resources for the Future. See COMPARING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS, supra
note 3; WORST THINGS FIRST, supra note 26. See also Hornstein, supra note 10.
29. See generally Kent & Allen, supra note 26; Minard, supra note 3.
30. U.S. EPA, 1 UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROBLEMS (1987) [hereinafter UNFINISHED BUSINESS].
31. Id. at 2-4 (preface by Administrator).
32. Id. at 91-95. See also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (NAPA),
SETTING PRIORITIES, GETTING RESULTS: A NEW DIRECTION FOR EPA 156 [hereinafter
A NEW DIRECTION FOR EPA] (graph comparing spending and risk levels).
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yses,33 and EPA's Science Advisory Board ("SAB") undertook a
more detailed and broadly based effort to examine EPA's priori-
ties. 4 Its report, Reducing Risk: Setting Priorities and Strate-
gies for Environmental Protection (the title suggests the extent to
which risk had come to dominate EPA's thinking), the SAB
strongly endorsed comparative risk assessment, an endorsement
that EPA leadership eagerly promoted. 5 However, it declined to
issue precise rankings or to compare directly between human
and ecological and welfare effects, or even to make direct com-
parisons within human effects, recognizing the vast difference
between known risk endpoints. It advocated for the first time a
role for the public. 6
EPA's comparative risk activities culminated with the estab-
lishment of a division of the Office of Strategic Planning and
Environmental Data, which not only used the internal compar-
ative risk exercises for its planning purposes, but also encour-
aged states and localities to undertake their own priority setting
activities through grants and guidance." Outside EPA, compar-
ative risk assessment attracted a great deal of academic, policy,
and Congressional interest as well. 8 It is as a result of EPA's
sponsorship that state and local environmental priorities projects
were begun and sustained.39 The state and city projects have
differed in many ways from the EPA models and from each other
- in organization, membership, risk categories, ranking strate-
gies, role of non-risk considerations, and decisionmaking proce-
dures - however, they are uniform (or nearly so) in adopting the
SAB's recommendation that the process include the general pub-
lic instead of being an internal, expert effort like Unfinished
Business. °
33. U.S. EPA, COMPARING RISKS AND SETTING ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES: OVER-
VIEW OF THREE REGIONAL PROJECTS (1989).
34. The opening sentence of UNFINISHED BUSINESS had declared, 'The fundamen-
tal mission of the Environmental Protection Agency is to reduce risks to health,
ecosystems and welfare," supra note 30, at 1.
35. Jonathan Bender, Societal Risk Reduction: Promise and Pitfalls, 3 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L. J. 255, 259-62 (1995).
36. SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD (SAB), U.S. EPA, REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORI-
TIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION app. B at 32-34 (1990) [here-
inafter REDUCING RISK].
37. See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 7.
38. See Bender, supra note 35, at 259-62.
39. See Minard, supra note 3, at 33.
40. See MINARD ET AL., FORCE FOR CHANGE, supra note 3, at 10-12. The excep-
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The relatively early California Comparative Risk Project in-
volved three expert ranking committees for human health, social
welfare, and ecological health; public committees on environmen-
tal justice and education; and a statewide community advisory
committee on policy questions.4 The later Ohio project used a
technical assessment group to provide information and a public
advisory group to take the lead in risk ranking.42 It was in the
state rather than the federal projects, then, that the democratic
decisionmaking element of environmental priorities projects
really took shape.
B. The Comparative Risk Debate
Commentators have distinguished two versions of comparative
risk assessment.4" The "hard" version emphasizes quantitative
comparisons of risk, ideally resulting in a unified ranking of
risks from highest to lowest. This usually includes a large ele-
ment of technical or expert assessment of risk, and it requires a
very substantial amount of information to be successful. The
"soft" version is less quantitative, and its environmental data
and results are more narrative (i.e., conveyed in words and de-
scriptions rather than in numbers). In practice, most priorities
projects use a soft methodology. The EPA and California projects
not only distinguished among human risk, social welfare effects,
and ecological effects (Unfinished Business even distinguished
between cancer and non-cancer health risks), but they also
avoided direct comparisons across the types of risks." More-
over, they grouped problems into high, medium, and low catego-
ries to describe the seriousness of the risks (though Unfinished
tion is the Michigan project, which was comprised of government officials only. Id.
41. CALIFORNIA COMPARATIVE RISK PROJECT, CALIFORNIA EPA, TOWARD THE 21ST
CENTURY: PLANNING FOR THE PROTECTION OF CALIFORNIA'S ENVIRONMENT (May 1994).
[hereinafter TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY].
42. OHIO COMPARATIVE RISK PROJECT, OHIO EPA, OHIO: STATE OF THE ENVIRON-
MENT REPORT 8-13 (Dec. 1995) [hereinafter OHIO: STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT RE-
PORT].
43. See Hornstein, supra note 10, at 585; Finkel, supra note 26 at 7-8; Jonathan
Lash, Integrating Science, Values, and Democracy Through Comparative Risk Assess-
ment, in WORST THINGS FIRST, supra note 26, at 74-76. See also A NEW DIRECTION
FOR EPA, supra note 32, at 141-42 (using the terms "narrow" and "broad," respec-
tively, for "hard" and "soft").
44. UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 30, at 5-8; REDUCING RISK, supra note 36,
at 8; TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 41, at 5.
1997]
82 NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW
Business ranked within the categories), instead of developing
specific numerical risk designations.45 Ohio took a similar ap-
proach, but developed a system for rough comparisons across
areas.4" Actual priorities projects chose the soft approach for
two reasons. First, they did not have nearly enough firm data
available to make credible quantitative evaluations of risks
across all of the programmatic areas or environmental media
that were being compared.47 Second, narrative description
avoided the problem of comparing unlike problems, such as
drinking water and workplace safety, or radon and hazardous
waste sites.48
The logic of comparative risk and quantitative risk assess-
ment, however, treats soft comparisons as a second-best to quan-
titative comparison.49 If one is serious about determining which
problems are worst and which solutions are most cost-effective,
the thinking goes, one should attempt to understand exactly how
the hazards and remedial programs rank. ° Given limited re-
45. UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 30, at 26, 42, 55; REDUCING RISK, supra
note 36, at 13-14; TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 41, at 83-84.
46. OHIO: STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT REPORT, supra note 42, at 15-21; A NEW
DIRECTION FOR EPA, supra note 32, at 142. The Ohio system for comparing across
risk types involved an implicit ranking of human health and ecosystem risk higher
than quality-of-life risks. Items that scored high in more than one risk category
would risk highest overall. Id. A more elaborate, but still primarily narrative ap-
proach is described in CHRISTINA CHOCIOLKO & W.G.B. SMITH, SETTING ENVIRONMEN-
TAL MANAGEMENT PRIORITIES: RETHINKING RISK ANALYSIS (Working Paper Series 96-
3, 1996).
47. E.g., UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 30, at 535-41; REDUCING RISK, supra
note 36, at 8; TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 41; OHIO: STATE OF THE ENVI-
RONIvIENT REPORT, supra note 42, at 8-13.
48. E.g., UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 30, at 5; REDUCING RISK, supra note
36, app. B at 32; TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 41; OHIO: STATE OF THE
ENVIRONMENT REPORT, supra note 42, at 8-13.
49. As Hornstein points out, the hard version is no straw man; it has plenty of
adherents. Hornstein, supra note 10, at 584-87. Moreover, despite frequent disclaim-
ers of reliance on a hard version, the institutional pressures to quantify, described
above, remain. A good example of these mixed signals can be found in the NAPA
report. On one hand, NAPA recommends that EPA "[make risk analysis and com-
parisons of risk-reduction approaches a central feature of EPA regulation and priority
setting." On the other hand, it warns (in smaller type) that EPA should "use a broad
definition of risks, costs, and benefits, consistent with public values." A NEW DIREC-
TION FOR EPA, supra note 32, at 67.
50. Howard Latin has criticized the whole idea of "fine-tuning' environmental
law. While his criticisms are directed to a different type of fine-tuning (using market
mechanisms to allocate pollution restrictions more efficiently), they are relevant here.
See Howard A. Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of
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sources and a goal of risk reduction, such an analysis would re-
veal definitively how best to allocate the resources. Hence, the
existence of a hard version exerts a constant pressure to make
more definitive quantitative comparisons across greater numbers
of activities.5' Ironically, though, it is in the hard, quantitative
version of risk comparison that the weaknesses of the technique
are most apparent and most serious." Despite the apparently
ineluctable logic of setting environmental priorities and of uti-
Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267
(1985) (arguing that overemphasis on precision in regulation results in overly timid
responses to environmental problems).
51. The environmental priorities projects make risk comparisons across several
programs or environmental media. However, there is a different kind of comparative
risk analysis which compares the risk consequences of choices within a particular
program or environmental activity. For example, the decision to clean-up a hazardous
waste site may reduce risk to the site's neighbors over the long term, but it will also
increase the risk to remediation workers in the short term. See John S. Applegate &
Steven M. Wesloh, Short Changing Short-Term Risk: A Study of Superfund Remedy
Selection, 15 YALE J. ON REG. (1998). Some risk scholars have developed very elabo-
rate analytical systems for making such comparisons, and they are invariably quanti-
tative or aspire to quantification. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the
Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851, 900-906 (1996); RISK VERSUS
RISK: TRADE-OFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 16-17 (John D.
Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995) [hereinafter RISK VERSUS RISK]; W.
Kip Viscusi, Risk-Risk Analysis, 8 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 5, 12-13 (1995); W. KIP
VISCUSI, FATAL TRADE-OFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK (1992);
STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULA-
TION (1993). In some ways, these intraprogram comparisons are more analytically
sound and useful in policymaking, but they also suffer from some of the same limita-
tions that interprogram comparisons do. See John S. Applegate, When the Cure is
Worse Than the Disease (abstract of presentation at Symposium on Risk, Science &
Law, Society for Risk Analysis Annual Meeting (Dec. 10, 1996)) (describing Superfund
remediation risk as a problem in comparative risk analysis). In any event, this essay
does not address such analysis.
52. It should be noted, however, that the soft version of comparative risk assess-
ment is not immune from criticism by environmentalists. See Finkel, supra note 18,
at 347-50. The environmentalist critique of comparative risk assessment appears in
several of the chapters in COMPARING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS, supra note 3, and
WORST THINGS FIRST, supra note 26; Hornstein, supra note 10; Finkel, supra note
18; Symposium, Setting Environmental Priorities: The Debate About Risk, 17 EPA J.
13 (Mar.-Apr. 1991); Ellen K. Silbergeld, The Risks of Comparing Risks, 3 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 405 (1994); Adam M. Finkel, A Second Opinion on an Environmental
Misdiagnosis: The Risky Prescriptions of Breaking the Vicious Circle, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 295 (1994) [hereinafter A Second Opinion]; David A. Wirth & Ellen K.
Silbergeld, Risky Reform, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1857 (1995) (book review); Locke, supra
note 16, at 84-98; Richard N.L. Andrews, Long-Range Planning in Environmental and
Health Regulatory Agencies, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 515, 550-58 (1993); Anderson, supra
note 25, at 72-75. This section is a very brief synopsis of the main points made in
this voluminous literature.
84 NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:1
lizing comparative risk to set them, comparative risk has sub-
stantial and fundamental limitations which are suggested by
many projects' choice of a soft version of comparative risk.
At the most practical level, the problem is information. The
data to support credible quantitative descriptions of a broad
range of environmental problems simply does not exist.53 This
"data gap" could be remedied to some extent by massive spend-
ing on data generation and gathering, though this begs the
question whether comparative risk is where that money should
be spent.54 However, that spending would still leave a substan-
tial area of uncertainty that results from our incomplete scientif-
ic understanding of the effects of pollutants in the environ-
ment.55 Filling these gaps and uncertainties with assumptions
and default values is antithetical to the kind of rigorous quanti-
tative conclusions to which the hard version of comparative risk
aspires.56 Moreover, the existing information is not uniformly
distributed or available to all. Many commentators have noted
that industry holds much of the relevant data, especially on its
53. On the lack of data generally, see Applegate, supra note 14, at 284-98; Mary
L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce
and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1795 (1989). EPA was acutely aware of the problem
in its comparative risk studies, UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 30, at 14, 35-41,
REDUCING RISK, supra note 35, at 8, and it is a persistent theme of comparative risk
critics. See Bender, supra note 36, at 259-62; Robin Shifrin, Note, Not by Risk Alone:
Reforming EPA Research Priorities, 102 YALE L.J. 547, 559-65 (1992); Locke, supra
note 16, at 84-90. EPA's Science Advisory Board (SAB), for example, recently conclud-
ed that it could not properly measure environmental performance by various sectors
of industry, because it had no meaningful data on exposure, and without exposure
data it was impossible to "say anything definitive about the risk." See Enforcement:
Lack of Exposure Information in SFIP Hinders Risk Assessment, SAB Panel Says, 28
ENVT. REP. 999 (Sept. 26, 1997). The board went on to suggest that toxicity or haz-
ard information alone might be useful for setting priorities. Id. Although that sugges-
tion is probably correct, it is a far cry from the hard version of comparative risk.
54. In comparative risk terms, it is almost certain that the risk reduction
achieved by spending limited resources on analysis would be less than spending that
money, even inefficiently, on attacking environmental problems themselves. See John
S. Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End in Itself- The Role of Risk Assessment in
Environmental Decision-Making, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 1643, 1648-51 (1995) (criticizing
regulatory reform legislation for itself imposing inefficient costs); Shifrin, supra note
53, at 559-65, 569-75 (expressing concern that risk-based priority setting will take on
a costly life of its own).
55. See Applegate, supra note 14, at 285-89.
56. Adam Finkel argues that risks due to uncertainty and variability can only be
described as ranges, noting that once the risk range is considered, rankings are like-
ly to be less definite and even reversed. Finkel, supra note 18, at 335-38.
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processes and the hazards of its activities and products.57 This
is to be expected, of course, but environmentalists are justifiably
concerned that priority setting based on selectively revealed
information will be not only inaccurate, but skewed.
Risk itself has a distinct technical and political "allure" to
beleaguered regulators and industries. It offers an apparently
scientific justification for regulatory action (or inaction) that
considers other dangers and, through cost-benefit analysis, the
benefits of a particular activity.58 The choice of quantified risk
as the measure of environmental danger is itself a policy choice
and a value judgment. To some degree, risk is problematic be-
cause it has its own potential for inaccuracy - where informa-
tion is scarce and judgment must fill the gaps, 9 misperception
or biased perception undermine claims to objectivity. More im-
portant, quantification distracts attention from the underlying
value choices,6 ° and it obscures fundamental changes that
might avoid the trade-offs altogether.61 Also, by focusing on ad-
justing risk consequences, we may be discouraged from examin-
ing underlying causes.
Fundamentally, risk is a grossly incomplete way of looking at
environmental problems. It does not, without more, describe the
distribution of risk (is it fairly uniform across the population or
is it focused on a small geographic or demographic group?), nor
57. See, e.g., Lyndon, supra note 53 (generally arguing that environmental policies
should be designed to encourage the development of toxicity information by industry).
Alternatively, they "choose ignorance" of toxic hazards. See Wendy Wagner, Choosing
Ignorance in the Manufacturing of Toxic Products, 82 CORN. L. REV. 733 (1997).
58. In fairness, regulators and industry are not the only outcome-based users of
science, as Wendy Wagner has recently reminded us. Wagner, supra note 21, at
1650-73.
59. UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 30, at 2-4; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT 80-84 (1994).
60. This is a universal concern about comparative risk assessment. See, e.g., M.
Granger Morgan, Quantitative Risk Ranking: More Promise than the Critics Suggest,
in WORST THINGS FIRST, supra note 26, at 116-42; Finkel, A Second Opinion, supra
note 52, at 330 ('The gulf is not between facts and values, but between value-laden
facts and fact-laden values."); Wirth & Silbergeld, supra note 52, at 1875-77; Michael
S. Baram, Use of Comparative Risk Methods in Regulatory and Common Law, 13
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 12 (1987); Bender, supra note 36, at 259-62.
61. Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Para-
digms and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369 (1993);
Finkel, A Second Opinion, supra note 52, at 323-24; Shifrin, supra note 53, at 559-
62, 569-75; see also Wirth & Silbergeld, supra note 52, at 1871 (describing such
trade-offs as "Sophie's choice").
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the source of the risk (is it a well-operated steel mill or a mid-
night dumper?). In both cases, the distribution of the risk and its
source raise the question of the "equity" or fairness of the risky
activity. Voluntarily assumed risks or risks over which the ex-
posed persons exercise some control are understood differently
from those imposed involuntarily, especially if they are wrongful-
ly imposed. Risk also does not consider the relative ease or diffi-
culty of reducing or eliminating the risk. In deciding which envi-
ronmental problem is "worst," one might well find a highly
avoidable but numerically low risk less justifiable than a numer-
ically high but difficult to control risk. Likewise, a risk reduction
activity that brings with it collateral benefits (for example, re-
ducing car travel also reduces our dependency on foreign oil)62
might well be preferred to an action that more substantially
reduces health risks. Finally, a small risk of a catastrophic result
is mathematically the same as a larger risk of a less dire out-
come. But people are justifiably more concerned with the possi-
bility of a catastrophe to themselves through a fatal illness like
cancer or a catastrophe to the population generally through an
environmental disaster like Chernobyl.
The underlying problem with risk as the metric for comparison
is that there are many kinds of risks, and they affect many dif-
ferent groups of people and the environment in different ways.
The first question must be: risk of what? For toxic substances,
EPA uses risk of death from cancer as the primary endpoint, but
as noted above that is really very narrow." Cancer is not the
only disease of concern to us. Other health effects about which
science understands very little, such as endocrine disruption and
genetic mutation, may seem equally sinister. Moreover, since
environmental priorities projects are not limited to toxic chemi-
cals or to human health, the cancer death measure seems even
more constraining. As one commentator on a cost-benefit analy-
sis of smog reduction said, "how do you put a value on an asth-
62. Some comparative risk advocates, for example, John D. Graham, Saving Gas-
oline and Lives, in RISK VERSUS RISK, supra note 51, at 87-103, would treat depen-
dency on foreign oil as a "risk" as well, to be compared to the risks of pollution. But
the risks associated with dependency on foreign oil, such as constraints on foreign
policy, high costs of manufacturing and higher commuting costs, are so different from
health and environmental risks that this use of the term stretches it to
meaninglessness. In that sense, every bad consequence is a "risk."
63. See Finkel, supra note 18, at 330-31.
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ma attack?"64 In the occupational setting, serious and debili-
tating injuries are far more common than fatalities, and are thus
arguably the more serious concern. Occupational injury also
raises the question whether risks to workers, which we to some
extent voluntarily assumed and compensated, should be treated
the same or differently from risks to the general populace.65
Should risks to children be evaluated on a par with population
risks? What about risks to the elderly? And how are harms to
the natural or physical environment to be measured against
human health risk? Unless it can place a numerical value on the
distinction (for example twenty-five dollars for an asthma attack,
or a fifty percent discount of voluntary workplace injuries), quan-
titative analysis alone cannot reflect these differences.
The foregoing is often referred to as the "apples and oranges"
problem with comparing risks. As Adam Finkel has pointed out,
however, there is no difficulty in comparing apples and oranges,
as long as the criteria for comparison are clearly understood and
are material to the decision to be made.6 The problem is that
risk per se does not constitute an all-inclusive basis for compari-
son among environmental problems. Yet such comparisons are at
the heart of the comparative risk assessment enterprise, which,
by its own terms, treats all human health risks as
interchangable with each other and with effects on the natural
environment and social welfare. General comparisons cannot be
avoided in environmental priorities projects because they are the
purpose of the projects, but precise risk rankings that emerge
from environmental priorities projects should be viewed with
skepticism and used with caution.
C. More Modest Claims for Risk Comparison
Even if one could find or generate adequate data to give com-
parative risk assessment some semblance of precision, there are
too many non-numerical considerations, such as public values,
64. See James M. Lents, Letter to the Editor, 253 SCI. 607, 608 (1991) (rejecting
the valuation of an asthma attack at twenty-five dollars in Alan J. Krupnick & Paul
R. Portney, Controlling Urban Air Pollution: A Benefit-Cost Assessment, 252 SCI. 522
(1991)).
65. See RISK VERSUS RISK, supra note 51, at 16-17 (noting that occupational risks
are voluntarily undertaken and so may be evaluated differently from other risks).
66. See Finkel, supra note 18, at 332-35.
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risk distribution, differing characteristics of different risks, and
the like, to permit a fair analysis of environmental problems in
quantitative terms. Does this mean that comparing environmen-
tal hazards and setting priorities is impossible or pointless? No
- it means that the claims for comparative risk and environ-
mental priority setting need to be more modest ("softer") than its
strongest proponents allow, and, interestingly, closer to the actu-
al practice of comparative risk projects.
As an initial matter, we must recognize that priority setting
itself is not an obscure, arcane process with nefarious aims. The
concern is often expressed that environmental priority setting is
simply an excuse to take some problems off the table because
low-ranked problems will be ignored. Based on this concern,
many environmental organizations have eschewed involvement
in environmental priorities projects. But priority setting is some-
thing we all do every day, because none or very few of us have
the resources that allow us to live our lives as if we can do ev-
erything now, as much as we want. We have to decide what we
need, and then what we want most. The same thing also hap-
pens every day in every regulator's office: what are the most
pressing out of the whole universe of problems that they would
like to be able to deal with? Without setting priorities, they sim-
ply react to momentary crises, wasting resources and ignoring
important long-range problems. 7 The extremely serious threats
of global warming and ozone depletion, for example, are ignored
for this reason.
Priority setting even happens in environmental organizations.
Environmental organizations cannot possibly file every lawsuit
or fund every research project that they would like to; they make
hard choices about what they regard as the greatest needs. A
recent Nature Conservancy newsletter, for example, reported on
its priority-setting efforts with the United States Agency for
International Development as follows:
In late 1993 the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) realized it could no longer give equal attention to
biodiversity in all parts of the world. It needed a methodology for
determining those areas where proportionately greater investment
in conservation should be made. USAID requested that the
67. See Applegate, supra note 20, at 287-89, 319-24; DANIEL FIORINO, MAKING
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 3-7 (1995).
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Biodiversity Support Program, a consortium consisting of The
Nature Conservancy, World Wildlife Fund, and the World Re-
sources Institute, provide this methodology. The program invited
five other leading conservation organizations to serve on a non-
governmental organization working group to assist in developing
an approach to determining biodiversity conservation priorities in
Latin America and the Caribbean.
The principles developed at the Miami workshop are already
yielding some important and surprising results ....
The investment methodology [that resulted] included three
levels of analysis: biological importance; conservation threat and
opportunity; and policy and institutional capacity for conservation.
These three levels of analysis were then integrated to determine
investment priorities. And the results were profound. 8
These organizations could have simply told USAID that
biodiversity is too important to put a price tag on it, and so
USAID should simply do better in coming up with resources. But
instead of spurning the offer to get involved, the organizations
not only made a decisive difference in what was funded, they
also shed important new light on the problems facing them. The
article goes on to note, in fact, that "[n]umerous new priority
areas emerged that have not received significant attention in the
past."69 Instead of asking simply which problems are worst or
which pose the greatest risk, they asked where investment would
be most effective. Thus the organizations' conclusion, that certain
areas ought to receive "proportionately greater investment, 70
was hardly an endorsement of abandoning the rest. The USAID
process set priorities on actions, not problems.7
But there is priority setting and priority setting, so to speak,
and claims for it must be modified accordingly. First, a priorities
project should beware of, which is not to say that it should com-
pletely abjure, specific risk rankings and comparisons across risk
endpoints. The hard version that relies on quantified risk clearly
asks too much of extant risk data and of technical rationality. It
is simply misleading to suggest that the data are available that
68. NATURE CONSERVANCY, INTERNATIONAL UPDATE, SETTING PRIORITIES FOR CON-
SERVATION INVESTMENTS: GETING THE MOST FOR THE MONEY (Spring 1995).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. This strategy is recommended in MINARD, FORCE FOR CHANGE, supra note 3,
at 4-5. It was also adopted by the Hamilton County Environmental Priorities Project.
1997]
90 NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW
would support a precisely calibrated hierarchy of environmental
problems or actions. Moreover, scientifically defensible methods
for comparing risk types do not yet exist.72 General categories of
severity have provided useful and sometimes surprising results
in several projects, and narrative categories avoid the excesses of
overquantification. The maintenance of separate risk types, even
if they are ultimately combined (as in Ohio)7", reinforces the
idea that different risks implicate different distributional and
ethical concerns. In other words, there is also risk and risk, so to
speak, and priorities projects must not obscure the distinctions.
Second, a broader conception of the basis of priority setting
means that the relevant considerations cannot be limited to
items that are quantifiable, even in theory.74 Values and policy
choices are not only an inescapable part of environmental
decisionmaking, they may in fact dominate it. To turn the pro-
cess into a technocratic exercise misses the ethical basis of envi-
ronmental regulation, and it certainly undercuts the political
viability of the results. The chair of the Presiden-
tial/Congressional Commission on Risk Management has ob-
served:
[The] descriptive and evaluative features are more important than
the quantitative estimate of the magnitude of the risk or probabil-
ity of occurrence. Likewise, description of the sources and signifi-
cance of the assumptions and uncertainties is at least as impor-
tant as any quantitative modeling of those uncertainties.75
This requires not only the addition of values and other non-
quantitative criteria to. the analysis of each problem, but it
makes comparison among problems a complex, imprecise under-
taking. Again, this does not render comparisons useless. It sim-
ply means that our way of describing the comparisons must be
more narrative and detailed: the "x > y" model will not do the
72. Locke, supra note 16, at 98.
73. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
74. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL RISK, ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES, AND POLITICAL
CHOICES: BEYOND EFFICIENCY TRADE-OFFS IN PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS (John Martin
Gillroy ed., 1993) (a series of essays defining environmental values in other than
quantitative, cost-benefit terms); MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHI-
LOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1988) (arguing that environmental regulation
is and should be the expression of principles and public values, not technocratic cal-
culation).
75. See Omenn, supra note 26, at 31.
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job. Not only is risk one of several factors, but risk descriptions
themselves must take account of the different qualities of differ-
ent risks. "The unmet challenge of [comparative risk assessment]
is to describe disparate risks in rich, informative and non-ma-
nipulative ways."78 Another way of stating this is, since not ev-
ery relevant consideration can be characterized - and certainly
not quantified - as a version of risk, risk assessment is but one
of several analytical tools for making good environmental
policy.
77
Third, the priority setting process must involve and be under-
standable to the people who are affected by the problems being
ranked." Except perhaps as an internal analytical exercise, en-
vironmental priority setting cannot be a technical project run ex-
clusively by environmental policy experts. In part, this is a corol-
lary of the mandate to include public values in the analysis. Who
better to identify and apply public values than the public itself?
The public is also an important source of information on the
sources and effects of environmental problems with which they
live on a daily basis.79 While public perceptions of the nature,
source, and degree of risk can certainly be erroneous or distort-
ed, o they have a direct contact and concern that experts ignore
at their peril.8' Finally, under the heading of enlightened self-
76. Finkel, supra note 18, at 335 (italics omitted). For a description of several
dimensions of risk and an insistence that they be fully considered, see id. at 338-47.
77. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, BUILDING CONSENSUS THROUGH RISK ASSESS-
MENT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ENVIRONMENTAL
REMEDIATION PROGRAM 3, 12-17, 35-37 (1994) [hereinafter BUILDING CONSENSUS];
OFFICE OF ENVTL. MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, RISKS AND THE RISK DE-
BATE: SEARCHING FOR COMMON GROUND 7 (1995); Applegate, supra note 54, at 1658-
64; Daniel C. Esty, What's the Risk in Risk?, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 603, 605-06 (1996)
(book review) (reviewing RISK VERSUS RISK, supra note 50); CARNEGIE COMM'N ON
SCIENCE,TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT, RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPROVING
REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING 81 (1993) [hereinafter RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT].
78. Applegate, supra note 54, at 1654-56; Department of Energy, Risk Assess-
ment, Management, and Communication and Priority Setting (1995) [hereinafter DOE
Risk Principles]. For the text of DOE Risk Principles, see Applegate, supra note 54
app. at 1675. This is generally consistent with the USAID process, which necessarily
involved international environmental organizations as surrogates for affected persons
in remote parts of the world.
79. Andrews, supra note 52, at 552-58.
80. JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman
et al. eds., 1982) (identifying several sources of distortion in public perception of
risk).
81. Wagner, supra note 21, at 1650-73.
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interest, public involvement builds the political support that any
priority setting effort will eventually require if it is to be imple-
mented. As many commentators on EPA priorities have noted
(usually with chagrin), technical evaluations of risk make little
headway against popular evaluations communicated to the agen-
cy through Congress.82 A closed process involving only designat-
ed experts is unlikely to garner much public enthusiasm.
With these more modest claims and aspirations, environmen-
tal priority setting can be a useful, transparent, politically sup-
portable enterprise. The soft version does not resolve all of the
problems of comparative risk assessment, but it facilitates a
plausible effort at the essential task of allocating environmental
resources as wisely as possible. We now turn to the second major
element of environmental priorities projects, a democratic
decisionmaking process.
III. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
There are good instrumental reasons, described above, for
involving the public in environmental priority setting. Funda-
mentally, however, public participation should be based on the
belief that it is the way that a democracy ought to resolve public
problems. We are in this together, and we depend on each other
for solutions. Moreover, we need to understand that while we
come to environmental priorities from different perspectives and
with different goals, those perspectives and goals overlap to a
greater degree than perhaps we realize. The managers and em-
ployees of industries that create risks to a community are also
citizens of the community, just as the citizens of that community
patronize and are employed by those businesses. The great ma-
jority of people have good intentions and high aspirations: they
want to do the right thing, even though they have very different
views of what the right thing is. If environmental and economic
goals can be mutually reinforcing, and if business and communi-
ty overlap, then we ought to be able to recognize that we have
common problems, that we have common goals, and then per-
82. Justice Stephen Breyer is the leading example of the chagrined observer. See
BREYER, supra note 8 at 33-51. He identifies a self-perpetuating cycle of public
misperceptions (aided and abetted by sensational press accounts), Congressional reac-
tion, and the inherent uncertainties in the regulatory process to account for the tech-
nically unjustifiable EPA priorities. Id.
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haps we can find common solutions. In a democratic society we
reach common solutions by decisionmaking processes that in-
clude as many of the affected or potentially affected persons as
are willing to participate.
A. Theory and Process
If the foregoing justification for public participation sounds
quixotic, it is probably because there is a growing dissatisfaction
with the poor quality of public discourse in this country. Many
concerns have been identified, but central among them is the ad-
versarial nature of public debate. We are encouraged to think of
ourselves as representing specific interests, which are different
to a greater or lesser degree than others' interests. Public
decisionmakers make choices and compromises among the vari-
ous interests - helping some, hurting others - in response to
each group's special pleas. As a result, people are encouraged to
treat each other as adversaries who need to be defeated or held
at bay. This interest group pluralism is the dominant view of
modern politics, and it has an increasing number of critics who
believe that it encourages the taking of extreme and selfish posi-
tions, obscures areas of agreement and common ground, and
entirely misses the possibility that there is a common good that
could be determined by working together thoughtfully to solve
common problems.83
This is not the place to develop deliberative democratic theory
83. The academic proponents of this view include a remarkably broad range of
scholarly disciplines, including lawyers, sociologists, historians, and political theorists.
For a sampling of wide variety of this literature, see Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the
Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Democratizing Amer-
ica Through Law, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 949 (1991); Frank Michelman, The Su-
preme Court, 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV.
4 (1986); ROBERT REICH, THE POWER OF PUBLIC IDEAS (1988); Robert Reich, Public
Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617
(1985). See also SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH, supra note 71; CHRISTOPHER
LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITS CRITICS 170-225, 530-32
(1991); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996); ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDI-
VIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985); ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL.,
THE GOOD SOCIETY (1992); JAMES C. CRIMMINS, THE AMERICAN PROMISE: ADVEN-
TURES IN GRASS-ROOTS DEMOCRACY (1995); JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY
DEMOCRACY (1983); DANIEL YANKELOVICH, COMING TO PUBLIC JUDGMENT: MAKING
DEMOCRACY WORK IN A COMPLEX WORLD (1991).
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in any length. However, deliberative democratic theory has some
important implications for the character of the decisionmaking
processes that have been adopted by environmental priorities
projects. First, it demands a decisionmaking process that is
broadly inclusive of affected and potentially affected persons. A
process that is built on respect for others' views, a willingness to
listen to and consider them, and a desire to reach consensus
cannot systematically exclude certain points of view.8 4 In formal
procedures, this is what "democratic" means. If simple voting of
ballots is not the system, then the alternative process must at
least permit that breadth of representation. Moreover, environ-
mental priorities projects are advisory in nature, are not elected,
and are not formally delegated governmental power. Their only
authority is their ability to include a broad spectrum of views
and to express them with as much agreement as possible. A five-
to-four vote makes constitutional law in the Supreme Court,"
but such a close vote means that an advisory board is deeply
divided.
Inclusion requires a transparent process. Both participants
and observers should be able to see the process by which deci-
sions are reached. Voting for elected leaders is transparent. For
an environmental priorities project, transparency applies not
only to procedural decisions like membership in the project, but
also to substantive decisions like the criteria for ranking risks.
Secrecy may have a place in some forms of negotiation," but
the participants in an environmental priorities project do not
represent, in any formal sense, groups that can negotiate about
priorities. A process that gains its legitimacy from the breadth of
84. It is inevitable, especially in view of the controversy over environmental prior-
ity setting and comparative risk assessment, that some groups will refuse to partici-
pate in the project. Participation cannot be compelled, so inclusiveness means in ef-
fect an open door to all points of view. It would be unwise to require full participa-
tion, because that would give opt-out groups a de facto veto on the results. Obvious-
ly, in some communities, the inability to involve one or a number of groups, despite
sincere entreaties, will render the results not politically viable, but that is the nature
of any political activity. Environmental priorities projects should focus on developing
a process that is attractive to as wide a spectrum of views as possible.
85. Justice Brennan is said to have admonished his law clerks that the most
important rule of constitutional law is the "Rule of Five" in Supreme Court voting.
86. Regulatory negotiation has sometimes been carried on in secrecy. As I have
described elsewhere, there are good reasons to distrust such a process. John S.
Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizens Advisory Boards in Ad-
ministrative Decisionmaking, 73 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 1998).
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its inclusiveness cannot rely on secrecy to reach decisions.
Second, a deliberative discussion is an informed discussion.
Thoughtful consideration of the issues offers little added value if
it is based on poor or inaccurate information. Information for
these purposes includes, for example, quantifiable facts about
environmental effects and the costs of pollution. Uncertainty and
variability are also facts that need to be fully presented and
considered. Values and principles are also relevant information
for the participants. Values can be discussed and evaluated, and
their relationship to other values can be explored. For example,
one cannot sensibly compare a serious widespread problem like
air pollution with a less risky (in a quantitative sense) but high-
ly localized problem, like hazardous waste sites, without discuss-
ing the distributional issues and the values that each problem
implicates. Relevant information also includes the consequences
of environmental action or inaction, because, without that knowl-
edge, choices cannot be evaluated."7 A deliberative democratic
process must educate and inform its participants, in addition to
providing a forum for their discussions.88 This requires devel-
oping information and sharing information: meaningful dialogue
requires a common information base, so that participants can
operate on an equal footing.89
Third, deliberative discussion and debate is more than simply
registering or expressing views in the presence of others. It is a
dialogue, a willingness to listen to and consider the available
information and other points of view, and to respond to other
views candidly. Participants must be willing to change their
minds on the basis of the what they learn and what they hear.
Deliberative democracy seeks a genuine engagement among the
participants. Adversarial decisionmaking, on the other hand,
encourages position-taking before a third-party decider (judicial,
legislative, or administrative). The logic of the adversarial model
forces participants to take extreme positions, and to counter
extreme positions with extreme positions, in order to sway the
87. Finkel, A Second Opinion, supra note 52, at 330-31; WILLIAM LEISS &
CHRISTINA CHOCIOLKO, RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY 4-6 (1994).
88. REICH, THE POWER OF PUBLIC IDEAS, supra note 83, at 5-7, 124, 137-50.
89. The playing field must be level, but it need not be set at a high degree of
detail. In other words, the information necessary to make an individualized risk
assessment of the output of a particular factory is not necessary to a priorities pro-
ject, as long as none of the participants is operating at that level of detail.
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decisionmaker toward one side or the other. It also discourages
participants from taking responsibility for decisions, as their
task is to persuade someone else.
The acid test of a deliberative process is its ability to confront
hard questions. A careful, imaginative investigation of the
sources of environmental problems can sometimes reveal under-
lying solutions that are simple or that improve everyone's lot.
For example, it makes no sense to poison the environment with
pesticides to improve the yield on a crop that we have too much
of. Likewise, careful planning can sometimes accommodate both
an endangered species and its new neighbors. An open dialogue
among affected persons is the best way to discover such solu-
tions. However, hard questions will remain in the form of choices
that implicate the limits on what we can have, either in the
sense of restricted amounts of something or of conflicts with
other desires." Limits, as Christopher Lasch observed, are the
"forbidden topic" in modern political discourse.9' Environmental
law is full of such choices, and priority setting highlights them
by asking: 'With limited resources, what should we do less of?"
Skirting around hard choices by offering appealingly simple solu-
tions is a frequent strategy in adversarial situations (for exam-
ple, "the smelter's emissions are nothing to worry about" versus
"the smelter owner can easily adopt pollution prevention mea-
sures"), and in environmental position-taking in general. Deliber-
ation is a way to find solutions that all or most can live with,
even if it does not resolve the problem simply or to everyone's
advantage. Such solutions cannot be reached if the affected per-
sons do not frankly acknowledge the difficulties of the problem
and work with each other to find a solution.
Facing up to hard choices is also important because it involves
taking personal responsibility for common problems and for the
consequences of the solutions we choose.92 In EPA's public delib-
90. We may want, for example, to return hazardous waste sites to their pre-in-
dustrial condition, but we are limited in our ability to do this by technology (certain
contaminants cannot be effectively removed from groundwater with today's technolo-
gy), by expense (the Treasury could afford this for a few sites, but not all), and by
other goals (such a massive public works project that would undoubtedly result in
many occupational deaths and fatalities).
91. LASCH, supra note 83, at 22-23.
92. LEISS & CHOCIOLKO, supra note 87, at 4-6; YANKELOVICH, supra note 83, at
24-31; BELLAH, THE GOOD SOCIETY, supra note 83, at 283-86.
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erative process to decide how to handle the outdated smelter in
Tacoma, Washington, the difficulty was "to get people to take
responsibility, to educate themselves and one another about such
a difficult issue.""3 Administrator Ruckelshaus believed that
EPA should not decide the fate of the smelter of the citizens of
Tacoma who are collectively employed, supported, and harmed
by the smelter. Rather, he believed that the citizens must "decide
what they want[] for their community ... [and] determine their
own future."94 The vice of avoiding hard choices by taking unre-
alistic or uninformed positions is not only the instrumental prob-
lem of poor decisions. It goes to the heart of citizenship and the
recognition of mutual rights and responsibilities.
Fourth, for deliberative democratic theorists, the democratic
process is transformative. It moves citizens from fixation on their
own interests to an understanding of the common good and ulti-
mately, to a willingness to accept the common good for
themselves. This is not simply surrendering to the will of others,
because the common good must take account of each
participant's individual interests. Moreover, the common good is
not an a fixed position, but can only be known by the kind of
deliberative process just described. In operational terms, this
means that the participants in a deliberative process should
attempt to reach consensus, that is, a resolution that everyone
can live with. It is important, however, that perfection not be-
come the enemy of the possible. A consensus may be infeasible,
in which case the best that an advisory deliberative process can
do is to achieve a thorough understanding of relevant informa-
tion and the participants' differing views. Such an understanding
is not only valuable in itself as part of a democratic dialogue, but
it assists the regularly constituted authorities in reaching a final
decision.
An environmental priorities project that seeks, as most of
them do, consensus results among a broad spectrum of persons
interested in the environment, is implicitly drawing on the fore-
going elements of a deliberative democratic process. The more
attention is paid to these elements in the structuring of the pro-
cess, the more useful the project will be in stimulating public
dialogue on environmental issues.
93. REICH, THE POWER OF PUBLIC IDEAS, supra note 83, at 149.
94. Id. at 149 (quoting former EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus).
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A separate aspect of deliberative democratic theory is a ten-
dency to take local as opposed to national decisionmaking as its
model.95 Some of this can be attributed to nostalgia for the town
meeting of yesteryear, and there is clearly a danger in basing
theory on virtues that are to some extent mythological (town
meetings tend, for example, not to be very inclusive). 6 But it
also has to do with the relative ease with which local decisions
can be reached cooperatively and deliberatively, and, conversely,
the ease with which deliberative democratic processes can be
applied to local decisionmaking.
This feature, too, is of direct relevance to the conduct and
success of state and local environmental priorities projects. Local
problems are, generally speaking, relatively focused. The issues
are limited in scope, the sources of the problems are determina-
ble, and the solutions correspondingly apparent. The affected
public can be readily identified, and those who choose can partic-
ipate without undue inconvenience. The participants know each
other or know about each other, and they share much common
background information about the community itself. Moreover,
they have a clear common goal - in this context, a more envi-
ronmentally pleasing community - even if they disagree about
the means for achieving the goal and about the extent to which
it should be pursued in derogation of other goals like industrial
development.97 Participants in local decisions also have a clear
incentive to cooperate, deriving from the fact that they will have
to live with the consequences of their decisions and with each
other. This in itself imparts a sense of responsibility for the
decision and for the decisionmaking process. The participants
will suffer from bad decisions and their future relationships with
their neighbors will be strengthened or poisoned by the process
they used for reaching those decisions. 8
95. See, e.g., BELLAH, HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN
AMERICAN LIFE, supra note 83, at 168-86; CRIMMINS, supra note 83; Carol M. Rose,
The Ancient Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from the Attack
on "Monarchism" to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 74, 94-100 (1989).
96. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 83; BELLAH, HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM
AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE, supra note 83, at 205.
97. I do not want to overstate the commonalities within diverse communities,
especially where the diversity includes an element of "haves" and "have-nots", or of
inclusion and exclusion. Recognizing and acknowledging divisions is a necessary first
step to any realistic effort to find common ground.
98. SANDEL, supra note 83, at 314-15, 333-38.
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In sum, deliberative democratic theory implies a public
decisionmaking process that is open and inclusive, transparent
to participants and observers alike, educative and informed,
deliberative in the sense of promoting a genuine dialogue among
the participants, and aimed at reaching consensus or, at a mini-
mum, a thorough understanding of issues and positions. The best
prospects for implementing a deliberative process are at the local
decisionmaking level, where participants are more likely to share
information, goals, and a common future.
B. Deliberative Democracy and Risk Assessment
Many of the elements of deliberative democratic process have
already found their way into the newest thinking on risk assess-
ment and management. The recent reports of the National Acad-
emy of Sciences and of the Presidential/Congressional Commis-
sion on Risk Assessment and Management emphasize the impor-
tance of communicating the results and the limitations of risk
analysis to the public (i.e., transparency), and of involving the
public throughout the process.99 The public also needs to help in
defining the problems, developing options for responding to
them, and choosing the response actions to be taken. As previ-
ously described, the California,"' Ohio,1"' and other state and
local environmental priorities projects have made public involve-
ment a central element, as does EPA's comparative risk guid-
ance. 
10 2
All the same, deliberative democratic theory has little intrinsi-
cally in common with the technocratic impulses of comparative
risk assessment, especially the hard version.' It therefore
99. The most recent authoritative pronouncements on risk assessment, however,
insist on the value of public involvement in the risk assessment and management
processes. 1 PRESIDENTIAL/CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON RISK ASSESSMENT AND
MANAGEMENT, RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN REGULATORY DECISION-
MAKING 39 (1997). See also UNDERSTANDING RISK, supra note 23; U.S. DEPT. OF
ENERGY, RISK ASSESSMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND COMMUNICATION AND PRIORITY SET-
TING (January 6, 1995), reprinted in John S. Applegate, A Beginning and Not an
End in Itself The Role of Risk Assessment in Environmental Decision-Making, 63 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1643, 1675-77 (1995); BUILDING CONSENSUS, supra note 77.
100. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
102. GUIDEBOOK, supra note 7, at 2-6.
103. For example, EPA's guidance views a "negotiated consensus" as the expected
way to reach ranking conclusions, but it does not reject voting or even pre-set formu-
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may seem odd that they should come together in environmental
priorities projects and improbable that such a mixture could be
successful. One response is that comparative risk assessment
and deliberative democracy have a dialectical relationship: they
react together and create the projects as a synthesis, and there is
no a priori reason that such a synthesis will not be produc-
tive.1 °4 Another response is that there is no real conflict be-
tween them: good risk assessment requires good public involve-
ment.1°5 Both of these responses are accurate. Deliberative de-
mocracy modifies technocratic comparative risk assessment by
injecting values and other public-regarding considerations. Con-
versely, comparative risk assessment is an analytical tool that
highlights unavoidable choices in environmental policy, and good
deliberation requires the consideration of such information. It is
also the case that the public has much to offer the analytical
techniques of risk assessment and risk management, so a
method that ignores public input is analytically unsound as well
as politically unwise.
Another reason for the confluence of comparative risk assess-
ment and deliberative democracy is that the practical conse-
quence of deliberative democratic theory - a dialogic,
nonadversarial approach to public decisionmaking - parallels a
current interest in collaborative decisionmaking that arises from
entirely different sources. Many observers of current environ-
mental regulation have come to the conclusion that the ad-
versarial approach is unduly cumbersome and produces ineffi-
cient results. One reaction is to develop market-based strategies
that give regulated entities more flexibility in complying with
environmental restrictions.0 6 Another reaction is collaborative
las. See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 7, at 17-18.
104. The connection between environmental priorities projects and deliberative
democratic processes is stressed in Minard, CRA and the States: History, Politics, and
Results, supra note 3; Lash, supra note 43, at 69-86; Alice M. Rivlin, Rationalization
and Redemocratization: Time for a Truce, in WORST THINGS FIRST, supra note 26, at
21-29; Jim Wilkins, Public Outreach, Feedback & Integration: A Comparative Risk
Dialogue -(National Comparative Risk Conference, New Orleans, 1994)
<http://www.epa.gov/oppeinet/oppe/futures/risk/topics/public/involved.txt.html>.
105. 2 PRESIDENTIAL/ CONGRESSIONAL COMM'N ON RISK ASSESSMENT IN MANAGE-
MENT, RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING
39, 7-37 (1997); see also UNDERSTANDING RISK, supra note 23, at 27-35; DOE Risk
Principles, supra note 78; BUILDING CONSENSUS, supra note 77.
106. Pildes and Sunstein, for example, champion such reforms at the national
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environmental decisionmaking. 117 By working together, the
agency and industry can arrive at protective but more realistic
and flexible regulatory requirements, and can do it more quickly.
Collaborative decisionmaking has been discussed most exten-
sively in connection with proposals for regulatory negotia-
tion.08 Regulatory negotiation proponents identify many of the
same defects of adversarial decisionmaking that deliberative
democratic theorists do, but the collaborative decisionmaking
advocates see the problem in instrumental terms. That is, the
problem with adversarial regulation is not a democratic deficit,
but regulations that are unduly rigid or unnecessarily costly or
ineffective because each side was unwilling to listen to the in-
formation provided and points of view of the others. Win-win
solutions are lost to the struggle for victory by one side or the
other. While the goal of dialogue is the same, one of the real
weaknesses of regulatory negotiation is its failure to involve a
broad cross-section of affected persons.0 9 Such negotiations re-
main largely the preserve of the environmental cognoscenti -
persons with technical expertise who-regularly deal with each
other on these issues. This excludes ordinary citizens who are
affected by the decisions or who are simply interested in them.
Therefore, while this version of collaborative decisionmaking
fails as a device for democratic decisionmaking, it reinforces, on
technocratic grounds, the case for deliberative processes.
Environmental priorities projects combine technocratic and
democratic elements of environmental decisionmaking. Priority
setting itself is an essential management tool, and it also reveals
underlying values and goals by forcing the recognition of choices
among them. Comparative risk assessment is a part of priority
setting, but its technocratic, hard version must be moderated by
the introduction of narrative, non-quantitative considerations.
The deliberative process that most environmental priorities pro-
level, in part on civic republican grounds. See generally Richard H. Pildes & Cass' R.
Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1995).
107. See generally Jody Freeman, Collaborative Government in the Administrative
State, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1997).
108. These are reviewed in Applegate, supra note 86 (identifying tle negotiation
model as a precursor of the deliberative democracy model of cooperative administra-
tive decisionmaking). Other collaborative efforts, such as EPA's Project XL, are dis-
cussed in Freeman, supra note 107.
109. See Applegate, supra note 86.
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jects use has both utilitarian and democratic advantages over
adversarial decisionmaking.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES PROJECTS AS A
DELIBERATIVE FORUM
The establishment of environmental priorities projects is usu-
ally justified by the need to make resource allocation decisions
and by the preference for seeking broad public participation in
those decisions. As we have seen, however, comparative risk
analysis, the method of choice for making priority decisions, has
serious limitations that can undermine the credibility of the
projects based on it. Because comparative risk analysis and de-
liberative democratic theory are separate developments, the
weaknesses of comparative risk analysis as a formula for priority
setting do not necessarily translate into weaknesses in priorities
projects as a deliberative forum for considering environmental
issues. In other words, environmental priorities projects have
value as a democratic process, whether or not one is willing to
credit fully the substantive results of its exercise in comparative
risk assessment.
The remainder of this essay considers the democratic values of
environmental priorities projects, of which there are at least
four: they focus attention on environmental issues across a wide
spectrum of the population; they provide an occasion for assess-
ing and inventorying a state or community's environmental prob-
lems; they provide a forum for dialogue and deliberation among
interested parties who communicate with each other too rarely;
and they can form the basis for building long-term cooperative
relationships among persons interested in resolving our shared
environmental problems. While the substantive result of a
project's deliberations (i.e., its actual list) is not, in this view, of
critical importance, the fact that it is a priorities project greatly
enhances its value as a deliberative forum.
A. Inclusion
Most of the time, the environment per se does not spark broad
public activism. As with many public issues, it takes a crisis.
Without a crisis, the range of participants shrinks to the "usual
suspects," persons sufficiently invested in environmental issues,
by ideology and/or employment, to maintain a long-term pres-
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ence. The problem with environmental management as crisis
management (wholly apart from the usual criticism that it re-
sults in skewed priorities, which is one reason for establishing
environmental priorities projects in the first place) is that it
places decisions in a heated, urgent, and often polarized context
that is hardly conducive to deliberation or thorough consider-
ation of other perspectives. Environmental priorities projects are
not crises, obviously, but they do constitute a specific event with
a specific product. If they are established under the auspices of
governmental entities who are seeking priorities advice, they
offer in addition a concrete opportunity to influence official
decisionmaking. As such, they provide an attractive opportunity
to consider environmental problems under less fraught condi-
tions than a crisis.
If the bad thing about a crisis is the "crisis atmosphere," the
good thing about a crisis is that people who would not otherwise
do so get involved in public decisionmaking.11 ° Otherwise pas-
sive citizens get involved because they feel threatened in some
way, and so they see a need and an opportunity to affect envi-
ronmental decisions. Again, an environmental priorities project
is not a crisis and will not arouse the truly apathetic. But it is a
more unique event than routine rules, permits or even legisla-
tion, and by its nature it requires a more limited time commit-
ment. Environmental priorities projects can also make environ-
mental decisionmaking more transparent by gathering facts,
discussing values and consequences, and reaching decisions in an
open, well-explained process. An environmental priorities project
can, in these ways, attract the interest of people or groups who
do not ordinarily participate in environmental decisionmaking,
those who are disenchanted with the adversarial or "backroom"
nature of public debate and decisions, and those who are inter-
ested in environmental issues generally but have no clear outlets
for their interest. In this way, environmental priorities projects
serve the democratic function of inclusion, by expanding the
discussion of public issues as broadly as possible.
110. See Donald T. Hornstein, Paradigms, Process, and Politics: Risk and Regulato-
ry Design, in WORST THINGS FIRST, supra note 26, at 155-57 (also arguing that the
passion and "irrationality" of the reaction to crises are necessary to the continuing
political viability of the environmental movement).
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B. Assessment
Deliberative decisions need to be informed decisions, and so
one of the basic obligations of an environmental priorities project
is to develop the information on which priority setting is based.
A first step in virtually all environmental priorities projects is to
inventory and evaluate the environmental problems in the area
under study. The assessment phase often commands a great deal
of an environmental priorities project's time and resources, be-
cause the inventory represents the universe of environmental
problems that the project will consider, and the descriptive mate-
rial provides the raw data for setting priorities.'11
The assessment should give participants a clear sense of the
breadth of the problems that the state or locality faces, and it
should candidly report on the sources, nature, extent, and possi-
ble remedies. This enables participants to evaluate priorities in
the context of other problems, which is essential to understand-
ing the characteristics and seriousness of any single problem." 2
The Carnegie Commission observed that priority setting can be
used to "learn the public's 'informed judgment,' rather than to
make the relative risk analysis process more responsive to cur-
rent crises.""' If public expectations are unrealistic, perhaps it
is because people are unaware of the consequences of their posi-
tions. Experience with deliberative processes shows that the
public is capable of and prepared to take responsible action when
it knows what the real choices are.'
An assessment or inventory may be particularly informative
because such documents had not previously existed. It is the rare
state or municipality that has integrated its consideration of
environmental problems. More often, the problems are divided
among agencies (e.g., pollution abatement versus wildlife and
conservation) or among bureaus within agencies (e.g., air versus
water versus solid waste). Moreover, if the inventory is the prod-
111. See, e.g., MINARD ET AL., FORCE FOR CHANGE, supra note 3, at 13-14, 68-72;
GUIDEBOOK, supra note 7, at ch.3.
112. Omenn, supra note 26, at 31; Finkel, A Second Opinion, supra note 52, at
330.
113. RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 77, at 89.
114. Applegate, supra note 54, at 1653-54 (recounting the experience of a citizens
advisory board for a former nuclear weapons facility); JOHN DOBLE & JEAN JOHNSON,
1 SCIENCE AND THE PUBLIC: A REPORT IN THREE VOLUMES 5-18 (Kettering 1990).
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uct of an inclusive process, as it should be, it will reflect the
concerns and observations of groups who do not ordinarily partic-
ipate in environmental decisionmaking. Disenfranchised groups
often feel that their problems are ignored - which is a central
motivation for the environmental justice movement - and so the
inventorying process offers both an opportunity and an incentive
to become involved. As a collateral effect, the inventory may also
stimulate interest in the project by highlighting conditions that
are not generally known, or by revealing the sheer number and
range of environmental problems that face a state or community.
Finally, given its audience, the assessment should be present-
ed in a form suitable for non-experts. It should explain technical
concepts, like risk, that are often impenetrable to lay people. In
this sense, too, information reinforces inclusion by reducing the
barriers to entry into a technocratic regime.115 The level of de-
tail should correspond to the importance of the issue, the uncer-
tainty and variability of the data should be clearly described,
and alternative expressions of risk (for example, individual risk
versus population fatalities) should be presented.1 '6 In this
way, environmental priorities projects, because they require
information gathering as a first step, make informed
decisionmaking possible. They can help to level the playing field
between lay and expert participants by providing a common base
of knowledge, which in turn becomes the foundation for genuine
dialogue.
C. Dialogue and Deliberation
As the title of this essay suggests, environmental priorities
projects literally create a forum. They provide a place where a
wide range of interested persons can come together to work
through environmental issues. In this forum, the casually inter-
' ested person can work with the regular advocate, government
officials can work with private citizens, experts can work with
non-experts117 (or experts in other fields), and elected officials
can work with their constituents. Further, this can all take place
outside the usual channels dominated by invested actors, ad-
115. Wagner, supra note 21, at 1674-77.
116. Finkel, supra note 18, at 350-53.
117. See RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 77, at 89-90.
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versarial proceedings, and crises. Existing institutions tend to be
limited to technical or political insiders, so environmental priori-
ties projects expand access to a wider group. It works in reverse,
as well. Technical experts, regulators, and even elected officials
often feel isolated from the general public by the nature of their
jobs or by the need to render decisions." 8 Environmental priori-
ties projects can be an opportunity for them to work with the
public toward a common purpose rather than in an adversarial
setting.
Priorities projects encourage deliberation in several ways.
Priority setting forces the recognition of choices, but avoids the
adversarial nature of a particular dispute. A deliberative or dia-
logue process is easy to advocate in a contested situation, and it
can be successful, but it is far easier when the consequences for
any individual are less immediate. People can more easily step
back and look at problems in new ways without fearing that they
are weakening their positions in a particular dispute. The under-
lying question posed by comparative risk assessment - "What
should we do to make our lives safer, given limited governmental
resources to accomplish this?" - is a critical one for society, and
environmental priorities projects can provide a framework and
forum for answering it.'
Most important, priority setting gives shape and structure to
discussions. A brainstorming session on environmental problems
may be a pleasant enough way to pass a few hours, but without
a product it is unlikely either to garner much interest or to reach
any useful conclusions. The requirement to produce a set of pri-
orities imposes a structure on discussions - assessing informa-
tion, ranking results, etc. - and it uniquely forces actual en-
gagement with the issues. Without forcing choices, none will be
made and all sides will resort either to disagreement or to agree-
ment on platitudes. Priority setting "rubs our noses in the choic-
es we must make to solve one problem or another,"'12 and thus
forces us to confront our value choices. As this essay has suggest-
ed, a soft or modest version of comparative risk assessment does
this better than the doctrinaire quantitative version, but the
118. See Michael P. Healy, The Effectiveness and Fairness of Superfund's Judicial
Review Preclusion Provision, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 271, 343-44 (1995-96).
119. Finkel, supra note 18, at 347-50.
120. Anderson, supra note 25, at 78.
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utility of priorities as a way to get to the hard questions is clear.
The existence of a common pool of information demands that
participants make arguments based on that information instead
of simply positioning themselves on an issue. Participants can
explain why they take the position they do, and those reasons
are subject to challenge. As Mark Sagoff has said, citizens are
not simply collections of wants; they should act on principles,
and principles (unlike mere preferences) are capable of being
challenged and supported.'21 The challenge and response is the
essence of dialogue. One study of environmental priorities pro-
jects reported, "[vlirtually everyone we interviewed said that the
effort of ranking risks (or risk management priorities) forced the
participants to deal with the data and their values in a powerful
and productive way."'122
D. Consensus
The willingness to confront hard questions makes reaching
consensus harder, of course. But, just as a priorities project chal-
lenges participants to work with the available information, seek-
ing consensus challenges participants to look for common ground
and areas of agreement. The search for agreement is a good way
to test the limits of positions and the role of values. Even if con-
sensus is not reached, areas of agreement and disagreement can
be identified and reasons given. A project in which the partici-
pants simply "talk[] their way through the ranking[,] debating
the reasons for calling a given problem a higher or lower
risk""' improves the deliberative process and helps governmen-
tal decisionmakers to make more informed decisions. As with all
of the elements of deliberative democracy, the process for reach-
ing results can be of greater long-term importance than the par-
ticular outcome.12
4
[W]hat is needed most is simply gathering people together to
121. SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT, supra note 74, at 51.
122. MINARD ET AL., A FORCE FOR CHANGE, supra note 3, at 4.
123. Minard, CRA and the States: History, Politics, and Results, supra note 3, at
53.
124. The director of the California Comparative Risk observed, 'The primary lesson
I learned as Project Director is that the end result is not as important as the
means." TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 41, at 91.
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make the choices and talk about their conclusions, exposing their
assumptions and their wishes to public scrutiny. Even if such a
process produced conflicting results, EPA, the public, and Con-
gress would learn from the experience.'25
In sum, the real value of an environmental priorities project is in
"working through" the issues,"' even if the result is limited by
lack of consensus or by the nature of comparative risk assess-
ment.
The process of information gathering, followed by dialogue and
guided by the effort to find common ground, will have its great-
est value if it creates the groundwork for collaborative environ-
mental decisionmaking in the long term. Acquaintances and
relationships outside one's own group, formed in the course of a
collaborative decisionmaking exercise, make it possible when a
particular issue arises in the future to know where to turn and
what one will find there. The Maine Environmental Priorities
Project began as an effort to find
a better way to make environmental decisions. Six years and one
comparative risk project later, many of these same leaders are
seeking to institutionalize information-based-consensus-driven
processes for environmental management in Maine. Along the
way, they have built relationships that have spawned a variety of
other actions and opportunities for, as one project participant
states it, "building a vital center" among business, environmental,
and government communities. 2 '
Government officials and industry should know that their envi-
ronmentalist critics are thoughtful and concerned with the good
of the community as a whole, and environmentalists should
know that government officials are genuinely trying to do their
best under often difficult circumstances. When we only engage
with people who already have our own perspective, we tend to
demonize others, and that is only rarely fair. Building trust and
a habit of cooperative environmental decisionmaking takes a
long time and repeated interactions, but an environmental prior-
ities project can be the first step down that road.
125. A NEW DIRECTION FOR EPA, supra note 32, at 144.
126. YANKELOVICH, supra note 83, at 91.
127. Green Mountain Institute for Environmental Democracy, Lessons from the Tor-
toise and the Hare: MEPP Crosses Another Finish Line, 2(3) SYNERGY 1 (Green
Mountain Inst. for Envtl. Democracy, May/June 1997).
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V. CONCLUSION
Environmental priorities projects have their origins in two
very different impulses: a technocratic desire to establish priori-
ties among environmental problems by quantitatively assessing
the relative risks that they pose, and a democratic desire to
achieve more inclusive, more informed, and more deliberative
environmental decisionmaking. These impulses have no organic
connection, but combined they can improve each other. The tech-
nocratic element is enhanced by introducing a wider range of
considerations than comparative risk assessment demands, and
the democratic element is enhanced by using priorities to inform
and structure the dialogue. Public involvement is not, as the
traditional justification for environmental priorities projects
suggests, just an element (albeit an important one) in what is
essentially a comparative risk exercise.'28
Rather, priorities projects are public involvement, and, given
the difficulties of comparing risks, public involvement is indeed
their one entirely reliable outcome. Environmental priorities
projects can productively address the real problem of allocating
scarce environmental protection resources, they can promote
informed, deliberative discussion of environmental issues, and
they can build a foundation of cooperative long-term relation-
ships. Regardless, therefore, of the limitations of the comparative
risk assessment formula in producing a definitive list of priori-
ties, environmental priorities projects provide an invaluable
democratic forum for deliberating public policy.
128. See, e.g., MINARD ET AL., FORCE FOR CHANGE, supra note 3, at 10 (suggesting
that public involvement is important, but also "extremely difficult, time consuming,
expensive, and problematic"); Wilkins, supra note 104, at 2-7 (recognizing need for
dialogue, but treating it as one element of a comparative risk project).
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